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Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools: A
Search for a Consistent Equal
Protection Standard in Education
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.... [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.'

Introduction
The Supreme Court's unanimity in Brown v. Board of Education has
not extended to later cases dealing with equal protection challenges to
educational inequality. Nor has the Court maintained a consistent standard.' By rejecting the heightened scrutiny standard adopted in Plyler v.
Doe,3 and readopting the rational relation standard of San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez,4 the Court's decision in Kadrmas v. Dickin1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). In Brown, the Court, in an unanimous opinion, held that separate-but-equal schools for black and white children violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If
the schools were racially segregated, they were inherently unequal and violated the constitutional requirement that people in similar circumstances must be treated equally. Id..
2. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
3. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler,the Court applied the heightened scrutiny standard to
a Texas statute that prohibited illegal immigrant children from attending public school tuitionfree. It held that Texas could not deny illegal immigrant children the same free public education that other Texas schoolchildren received. Id. at 230. While deferring to the holding in
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), that education was not a fundamental right, the Court relied on the importance that Brown v. Board of Education gave to education to justify the heightened scrutiny standard of review. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-25. Justice
Brennan wrote the Plyler majority opinion. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens
joined him. Chief Justice Burger wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
4. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the Court held that education was not a fundamental
right. Id. at 35. The Court applied the rational relation test to uphold the constitutionality of
a Texas educational finance system that discriminated against poor school districts. Id. at 40.
Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in Rodriguez, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan dissented. Justice White wrote a
separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan. Justice Marshall wrote
another separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Douglas.
[581]
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son Public Schools' represents the latest shift in the standard for equal
protection review of education.
The right to an education, like the right to vote, is not one of those
rights specifically enumerated for protection by the Constitution.
Neither is education a fundamental right, nor poverty a suspect class.6
Absent these criteria, the Court applies the rational relation test.7
In Rodriguez, the Court applied the rational relation test to an equal
protection challenge to a Texas educational system.8 In Plyler, the major
educational case following Rodriguez, the Court rejected the rational relation standard and used instead the heightened scrutiny standard9 to
hold unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting illegal immigrant children from attending Texas public schools tuition-free.
This Comment will analyze the issues raised and the issues avoided
in the Kadrmas decision, paying particular attention to the Court's varying equal protection educational standards from Brown to Rodriguez to
Plyler to Kadrmas. These standards are particularly interesting in view
of the recent state court decisions on the constitutionality of wealthbased discrimination in education and the status of education as a fundamental right.1" Part I analyzes the equal protection educational standards the Court used in Rodriguez, Plyler, and Kadrmas. Part I also
discusses the evolution of these standards of review for education. Part
II focuses on the Kadrmas decision in detail, discussing why the Court's
cursory review of the equal protection issues both avoided the Court's
own precedent in Plyler and avoided a thorough analysis of the basic
issues involved in the facts of the case. Part III discusses the standard of
review applied in recent California state court cases in which California
courts have held that education is a fundamental right under the California Constitution."' The Comment concludes that Kadrmas left unanswered questions about the relationship between poverty and education.
5. 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988). Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Kadrmas,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Marshall

wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Blackmun.
6. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18, 35.
7. In the traditional rational relation test, legislation meets the constitutional standard if
it "bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 248 (Burger,

C.J., dissenting); see infra notes 17, 56 and accompanying text.
8. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44.
9. Heightened or intermediate scrutiny is justified in areas of "special constitutional sensitivity." See id. at 226. Heightened scrutiny raises the constitutional standard from the "legitimate state goal" of the basic rational relation test to the furtherance of a "substantial state

interest." Id. at 225, 230. See also infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of
heightened scrutiny.

10. See infra notes 119-133 and accompanying text.
11.

Id.
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Evolution of the Equal Protection Educational Standard
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, the Supreme Court re-

viewed an equal protection challenge to a North Dakota statute allowing
the state to charge a bus fee in non-reorganized school districts.' The
review was so cursory that it led Justice Marshall to comment, "[T]he
Court's facile analysis suggests some perplexity as to why this case ever
reached this Court."13 One explanation appears to be the present Court's
uneasiness with the implications of its 1982 holding in Plyler v. Doe and
its desire to reaffirm broadly the 1973 holding of San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.
Justice Powell wrote the Rodriguez majority opinion. In Plyler, he

joined the majority and provided the decisive vote. Justice Powell did
write a separate concurring opinion in Plyler, "to emphasize the unique
character of the cases before us." 4 He justified his apparent switch from
Rodriguez by saying, "These children ...

have been singled out for a

lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative classification that threatens the
creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 5 Justice Powell's replacement by Justice Kennedy, as well as the
addition of Justice Scalia to the Court, left open questions about which
standard the Court would apply to educational discrimination cases.
Justice O'Connor, a dissenter in Plyler, wrote the Kadrmas majority
opinion. The Court did not directly overrule Plyler, but refused to extend the Plyler holding beyond its facts. The Court ignored the Plyler
majority opinion written by Justice Brennan and relied exclusively upon
Justice Powell's concurring opinion and then-Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion to support the Kadrmas holding. 6 The Court avoided
the serious issues of wealth-based educational discrimination raised by
Kadrmas, and used Kadrmas instead to limit Plyler. The Court rejected
the heightened scrutiny standard that the Court adopted in Plyler and
instead applied the rational relation test of Rodriguez.1'
12. Small, independent school districts were encouraged to join other small districts by
reorganizing into large districts to consolidate expenses and promote efficiency. Free public
school bus transportation was provided as an incentive for the voters to vote for reorganization. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of North Dakota at 3-6, Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. 2481

(No. 86-7113); see also infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
13. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2491 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

14. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 238-39.
16. In Kadrmas, Justice O'Connor cited Plyler, then said, "We have not extended this
holding beyond the 'unique circumstances' [citing Justice Powell's concurrence in Plyler] that
provoked its 'unique confluence of theories and rationales' [citing Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Plyler]....
The case before us does not resemble Plyler, and we decline to extend the
rationale of that decision to cover this case." Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
17. Id. at 2489.
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, also avoided the equal protection issues raised in Brown v. Board of Education. 8 Brown held that
once a state had decided to provide a public education to students, it
must provide it to all students equally.1 9 The Court, in Kadrmas,
avoided any definition of the word "equal" in relation to educational opportunity and instead focused fleetingly on traditional equal protection
analysis. The reasons behind such a decision are far more complex than
a desire merely to limit Plyler narrowly to its "unique circumstances."
The very nature of a democratic society and the protection it gives to its
more vulnerable members are at issue.
In Plyler, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, raised the specter
of a growing underclass 20 perpetuated by a society ostensibly opposed to
such discrimination. The Court infrequently deals directly with controversial social problems. Brown v. Board of Education was one such courageous moment. 21 The Court would no longer tolerate segregation in
public schools. Plyer was another such moment. The Court would not
allow the state to deny children a free public education because of the
legal status of their parents.
In Rodriguez, the Court swung the other way. As long as children
received a minimum education, the Court ignored the obvious financial
inequality in the education they received. Kadrmas, by raising the issue
of wealth-based discrimination in public education, directly challenged
Rodriguez.
Some say these are not and should never be issues the Court must
2
face. 2 The legislature has the duty and responsibility2 3 to define social
change. The duty of the Court is to rule on the constitutionality of the
legislature's decisions. This reasoning grossly underestimates the power
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

19. Id. at 493.
20. Plyler,457 U.S. at 218-19. "The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation." Id. at 213;
see also id. at 241 ("But it hardly can be argued rationally that anyone benefits from the
creation within our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of whom will remain in the
State, adding to the problems and costs of both State and National Governments attendant
upon unemployment, welfare, and crime." (Powell, J., concurring)).
21. See generally Wright, The Judicial Right and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense of
JudicialActivism in an Age of ConservativeJudges, 14 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 487, 521 (1987).
22. Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Plyler concluded that:

The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it vest
judges with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem. Moreover, when this
Court rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political

processes, it deprives those processes of an opportunity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today's cases, I

regret to say, present yet another example of unwarranted judicial action which in
the long run tends to contribute to the weakening of our political processes.

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 253 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
23. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42.
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of the Court. Decisions such as Brown and Plyler affect society in a
profound way. Some would argue that these decisions also should have
been avoided in deference to legislative function.2 4 Others argue that
cases such as Brown are some of the Court's finest moments.2 5 Whatever
one's point of view, the current Court apparently is not yet ready to deal
substantively with the issues raised in Kadrmas and thus largely avoided
them.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states, in part, "No State shall.. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 26 Neither wealth nor education is
a right specifically protected by the Constitution. A statute concerning
education, or one having a different effect on the rich or the poor, is
presumed27 constitutional if it has a rational relation to a legitimate state
purpose.

The Court will apply strict scrutiny to a "suspect" class or a "fundamental" right, even though the Constitution does not specifically protect
such classes or rights. 28 In the Warren Court, race was a suspect classification and the Court applied strict scrutiny.2 9 Some members of the
Court were willing to go further: "Various majorities of the Warren
Court were willing to join opinions which claimed that legislative classifications based on wealth, like those based on race, are 'suspect' classifications triggering strict judicial scrutiny."3 0 Justice Douglas wrote, "Lines
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race are traditionally disfavored."'" Even if lines drawn on the basis of wealth are not
favored, they generally are not unconstitutional.3 2
24. "' IThe exercise of [the power of judicial review], even when unavoidable, is always
attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the
outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that comes from fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own
errors."' " Plyler, 457 U.S. at 253 n.15 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 22 (1962) (quoting J. B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07

(1901))).
25. See generally R.

KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE

(1976) for a discussion of the history and

the background of Brown v. Board of Education.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This Comment will focus on the definitions of equal

protection the Warren and Burger Courts used in the context of wealth-based discrimination
and education. For a discussion of various models of equal protection, see L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1436-1672 (2d ed. 1988).
27. See supra notes 4, 7.

28. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
30. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1625.
31. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (citation omitted).
32. In describing the Warren Court's attitude toward equal protection, Professor Tribe
says:

This sweeping language [describing J. Douglas in Harper]described a commitment to
equal justice for rich and poor alike, a commitment that the Warren Court often
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The most famous educational equal protection case of the Warren
Court was Brown v. Board of Education,3 3 written in 1954 by Chief Justice Warren soon after he became Chief Justice.3 4 The most famous education case of the Burger Court was San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez. The Burger Court's use of a wealth classification has been far
more restrained than that of the Warren Court and the expansion of
heightened review of wealth classifications into any new areas has been
halted.3 5 Notably, Plyler, while written by the Burger Court, did use
heightened scrutiny when neither a criminal nor a judicial basis for that
standard of review existed.3 6 While Plyler followed Rodriguez in holding
that education is not a fundamental right under the Constitution,37 the
Court went further by stating that neither is education merely some governmental benefit indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation, 38 referring to the famous passage in Brown in which Chief
elaborated and occasionally fulfilled in cases respecting the rights and opportunities
of the poor. The general proposition that wealth classifications are always suspect,
however, never accurately reflected the law. Although its sensitivity to the poor was
evident in a wide range of cases, the Warren Court had in fact employed the stricter
tier of equal protection doctrine to strike down only two sorts of laws disadvantaging
the poor: laws denying indigents or non-freeholders the franchise, and laws limiting
the access of indigents to various levels of a state's system of criminal justice.
TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1625-26 (footnote omitted).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. One of the lawyers representing Brown was Thurgood Marshall, then counsel of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Marshall was later appointed
to the Court by President Johnson. Marshall wrote the strong dissent in Rodriguez, the major
equal protection case of the Burger Court involving education and wealth as suspect classes.
Marshall echoed the equal protection concerns of the Warren Court but expanded the scope of
equal protection beyond judicial and criminal forums. Marshall echoes his Rodriguez dissent
in Kadrmas 16 years later. See infra notes 108-119 and accompanying text.
35. Professor Tribe describes the different treatment of wealth classification in the Warren
and Burger Courts:
Significantly, the Court has abandoned the ardent rhetoric of equal justice for the
poor, rhetoric which promised more than even the Warren Court had delivered, and
far more than the Burger Court was prepared to deliver in the name of equal protection of the laws. In conjunction with its deflation of rhetoric, the court has recast
what were originally equal protection and equal access cases in a new mold of "minimal protection" and minimal access. The remodeling, which purports to preserve
the holdings of the Warren Court's decisions while cutting away only the exaggerated language in which these holdings were clothed, has occasionally accomplished
radical sacrifices of both the spirit and letter of the Warren Court's equal protection
decisions. Finally, the imaginative compassion for the plight of the poor, which at
least informed and perhaps generated so many of the Warren Court's holdings in
tangential areas, has been replaced with a determined reluctance to tell the states
how to deal with the problems of their poor.
TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1626.

36. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
37. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
38. Justice Blackmun supported the Rodriguez decision but he, like Justice Powell, found
that a rigid application of the Rodriguez formula did not fit Plyler:
I believe the Court's experience has demonstrated that the Rodriguez formulation
does not settle every issue of "fundamental rights" arising under the Equal Protec-
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Justice Warren stated that "education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments." 3 9 While consistent with the
rhetoric of the Warren Court, Plyler went far beyond the Warren Court's
limiting factors of judicial or criminal forums4 for application of heightened scrutiny. The Court stated, "But more is involved in these cases
than the abstract question whether [the statute] discriminates against a
suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. [The statute]
imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status. ' 4 1 What the Warren Court did for race in
Brown, and what the Burger Court did for alienage in Plyler, the Rehntion Clause. Only a pedant would insist that there are no meaningful distinctions
among the multitude of social and political interests regulated by the States, and
Rodriguez does not stand for quite so absolute a proposition. To the contrary, Rodriguez implicitly acknowledged that certain interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded a special place in equal protection analysis.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 232-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
39. Justice Brennan did not specifically use either the words "heightened" or "intermediate scrutiny" to describe his test of a "substantial state interest." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
Justice Powell used the word "heightened" in his concurring opinion: "Our review in a case
such as these [sic] is properly heightened.... [T]he Court properly may require that the State's
interests be substantial and that the means bear a 'fair and substantial relation' to these interests." Id. at 238-39 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978)). Justice Powell distinguished the heightened scrutiny
standard from the strict standard in a footnote: "[S]trict scrutiny is not appropriately applied
to this classification. This exacting standard of review has been reserved for instances in which
a 'fundamental' constitutional right or a 'suspect' classification is present. Neither is present in
these cases .... " Id. at 238 n.2. Powell addressed Chief Justice Burger's dissent in note 3,
where Powell repeated the phrase "heightened standard of review." Id. at 239 n.3.
40. For an interesting discussion of limiting factors in equal protection cases, see Taylor,
Brown, EqualProtection,and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700 (1986). Taylor sees
limiting factors as economic. In the right-to-vote cases and the criminal appeal transcript
cases, in which heightened scrutiny was applied to wealth based classifications, the costs involved were relatively small. Taylor concludes that "once the courts faced claims that potentially involved much larger redistribution of resources, the decisions began to go the other
way." Id. at 1727.
In interpreting Rodriguez, Taylor claims:
[T]he majority was clearly troubled by the lack of limiting principles in the plaintiff's
claim. The class of people disadvantaged in the view of the majority was not welldefined by income. And if education were deemed a fundamental right, could not
similar claims be made about such matters as police and fire protection, nutrition,
and housing?
Id. at 1727-28 (footnote omitted).
41. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223. The Court continued, "[I]n the area of special consitutional
sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that supports the State
in denying these children an elementary education." Id. at 226. The Court raised the standard
from the furtherance of a legitimate state interest of the rational relation test, to a substantial
state interest. Id. at 224.
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quist Court was definitely unwilling to do for poverty in Kadrmas.42 All
three cases involved access to education. Race was held to be a suspect
class deserving strict scrutiny; but poverty, although Plyler opened the
door to heightened scrutiny status, was not to be allowed the same
protection.
II.
A.

The Kadrmas Decision

Facts of the Case

In 1979, the State of North Dakota passed a statute4 3 authorizing
non-reorganized school districts to charge a fee for the use of a public
school bus. Reorganized school districts provided free bus service for all
students farther than two miles from school. School districts were encouraged to reorganize to provide more efficient educational services to
widely dispersed, small school districts."
An obvious concern for parents in voting for reorganization was the
increased distance their children would have to travel to school if their
districts were reorganized. No longer, in many cases, could children
walk to their neighborhood school. Thus, free bus service in the reorganized districts was used as an incentive for parents to accept school district reorganization."
Several of the more populated districts, including Dickinson, chose
not to reorganize. Prior to 1973, the Dickinson School District provided
free bus transportation for all students living outside the city limits. After 1973, to ride the bus, a family would have to sign a contract obligating them to pay for the bus for the school year.4 6
For several years the Kadrmas family had signed a contract for their
daughter Sarita's transportation to school.4 7 At the time of the trial,
42. See also J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION 406-07 (1970) for a discussion of the Court's limitation of the Brown educational
equality rhetoric to racial equality.
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.2-06.1 (Supp. 1985):
Charge for bus transportation optional. The school board of any school district
which has not been reorganized may charge a fee for schoolbus service provided to
anyone riding on buses provided by the school district ....
Any districts that have
not previously provided transportation for pupils may establish charges based on
costs estimated by the school board during the first year that transportation is
provided.
44. Brief for Amicus Curiae of the State of North Dakota at 3-6, 12-13, Kadrmas, 108 S.
Ct. 2481 (No. 86-7113).
45. Id. at 5-6, 12-13. North Dakota's reorganization plan was a success; of the 311 districts in the state, 248 have reorganized. Thus, 80% of the school districts provide free transportation. Id.
46. Brief for Appellants at 8-9, Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (No. 86-7113). The fees were
$97/year for one child, $150/year for two children, $205/year for three children, and up to
$315/year for five or more children.
47. Id. at 5.
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Sarita was nine years old and in the fourth grade.4 8 The Kadrmas family
lived in New Hradec, North Dakota on a homestead farm. Previously,
the town of New Hradec had its own schools, but in 1979 the schools
closed and the New Hradec children began attending school in Dickinson, sixteen miles away.4 9 Sarita lived with her mother, stepfather, and
two younger siblings. Her stepfather worked in the oil fields of North
Dakota. Because his employment was sporadic, the family lived on
either a paycheck or unemployment benefits."
The family was unable to pay the entire transportation fee and was
already behind on their 1984 bus payments when the time came to sign a
contract for the 1985 school year.5 ' They asked the school district if they
could make a partial payment for 1985, but the school district refused,
saying that the contract had to be signed. 2 Families in nearby reorganized districts received the same service for free.13 When Paula
Kadrmas, Sarita's mother, refused to sign the contract, 54 the school bus
no longer stopped for Sarita.5 5
48. Id. at 3.

49. Id. at 9.
50. The briefs are in dispute as to whether the Kadrmas family was technically at the

poverty level. Brief for Appellants, supra note 46, at 3-5; Brief for Amicus Curiae of the
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the North Dakota Chapter of The American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation in Support of Appellants at 4-5, Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. 2481
(No. 86-7113); Brief for Appellees at 1-2, Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (No. 86-7113). There is
also reference to Sarita's father not paying child support. This does not appear relevant.
Whether the family actually was at the poverty level, their income was certainly low and the
busing fee would have put a considerable strain on their limited resources. The fee also would
have risen when Sarita's brother and sister began school.
51. Brief for Appellants, supra note 46, at 5.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 7.
54. The family thought the fee was unfair and wanted to contest it. They could have
signed the contract but continued to fall behind on their payments. One family was sued by
the school district for not paying the busing fee. The Bismark School District sued a Mr.
Walker in small claims court for delinquent busing fees. When Walker defended himself by
challenging the constitutionality of the busing fee, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
because he had voluntarily signed the contract, he had waived his rights both to object to the
fee itself and to its constitutionality. Bismarck Pub. Schools v. Walker, 370 N.W.2d 565 (N.D.
1985).
55. Hearings on House Bill No. 1444 Before the Senate Education Comm., 46th Ass.,
North Dakota (1979), quoted in Brief for Amicus Curiae for the State of North Dakota, supra
note 44. State Senator Berube asked the Dickinson School Superintendent, Benzie, what
would happen if a family did not pay the busing fee.
Well, I think we'd have to handle it exactly the same as we do our school lunch
program or any other program. If a family is destitute, not able to provide it, those
children would be brought to school and nobody would know that they didn't pay
the fee. I think if we had someone out there that was ornrey and had, you know,
plenty of money to pay the fee, I guess we'd say you can, your children/child's not
gonna get on the bus. Ya know, ya gotta have rules and you got to make them stick,
ya know.
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In September of 1985, Paula Kadrmas filed an action in
Stark
County District Court seeking to enjoin the Dickinson School District
from collecting any fee for bus services. The action was dismissed. Mrs.
Kadrmas then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota. The
court held that the school-bus-fee statute did not violate the Kadrmas's
equal protection rights and was constitutional under both state law and
the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the North Dakota
Supreme Court and upheld the constitutional57
ity of the statute.
B. Analysis of the Decision
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in Kadrmas, began the discussion of the merits5 8 of Kadrmas with a reference to the rational relation test in Rodriguez. "Unless a statute provokes 'strict judicial
scrutiny' because it interferes with a 'fundamental right' or discriminates
against a 'suspect class,' it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."5 9 The Court then rejected the appellants'
contention that "Dickinson's user fee for bus service unconstitutionally
Id. at 11. Although it might be kind to "[bring children] to school and nobody would know,"
such magnanimity is not a substitute for a more formal procedural waiver process.
56. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1987) aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
2481 (1988). The court characterized the 1979 statute as "purely economic legislation[, which]
must be upheld unless it is patently arbitrary and fails to bear a rational relationship to any
legitimate government purpose." Id. at 902. The court then concluded that "the charges authorized by [the statute] are rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of allocating limited resources and that the statute does not discriminate on the basis of wealth so as
to violate federal or state equal protection rights." Id. at 903.
57. Certiorari was granted and the case was argued on March 30, 1988, and decided on
June 24, 1988. The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the North Dakota Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation wrote an amicus curiae brief for the
appellants, Paula Kadrmas and Sarita Kadrmas. The Attorney General of the State of North
Dakota wrote an amicus curiae brief for the appellees: the Dickinson Public Schools, the
Superintendent of the Dickinson Public Schools, members of the Dickinson School Board and
the Transportation Supervisor of the Dickinson Public Schools.
58. After describing the facts of the case, Justice O'Connor dealt with two procedural
issues: mootness and estoppel. The school district claimed the case was moot because in 1987
Sarita's mother signed the bus contract. Also, while the case was in litigation, Sarita had been
riding the bus. O'Connor held that the controversy was not moot because if the case were
decided in the Kadrmas's favor, they would have no future liability for bus payment. Sarita's
younger brother and sister would also have been able to ride the bus free. The second procedural issue raised by the school district was that since the Kadrmases were receiving a benefit,
they were estopped from contesting its constitutionality. The appellees cited Fahey v. MalIonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), saying, "[I]t is well established that one may not retain the benefits of
an act while attacking the constitutionality of the same act." O'Connor distinguished Fahey
and held that estoppel did not apply because the Kadrmases were not receiving a benefit, but
were bearing a burden. Thus, they could contest the constitutionality while still participating
in the service. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2486.
59. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16-17).
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deprives those who cannot afford to pay it of 'minimum access to education,' "I because Sarita Kadrmas continued to attend school during the
time she was denied access to the school bus.6 1 This point raises an important issue in the case. The fact that Sarita continued to attend school
meant that any deprivation she experienced could only be relative. This
distinction between relative and absolute deprivation helped set the standard of review in the majority opinion.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Rodriguez, set two threshold
questions for finding a "suspect" classification based upon wealth:
"[1] the class of disadvantaged 'poor' [must] be identified or defined in
customary equal protection terms, and [2] ... the relative-rather than
absolute-nature of the asserted deprivation [must be significant]." 6
Rodriguez and Kadrmas6 were not able to pass the threshold test under
this type of analysis. The "lack of personal resources [of the parents in
Rodriguez] has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit [-education of their children]."" The class of "poor" people was
also too large, diverse, and amorphous and had none of "the traditional
indicia of suspectness." 65 The Court concluded in Rodriguez, "For these
two reasons-the absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of 'poor' people or that it results in the absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged class is
not susceptible of identification in traditional terms."6 6
60. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellants, supra note 46, at i).
61. The total annual income of the Kadrmas family was $15,003.43. This included a
gross income of $12,639.43 in wages and $2,194.00 in unemployment compensation benefits.
The trial court found this to be at or near the poverty level as determined by the guidelines
used in North Dakota for the purpose of determining eligibility for various social assistance
programs. Brief for Appellants, supra note 46, at 4. Sarita's mother and her neighbor shared
driving the children to school. The gasoline costs amounted to more than $1,000 for the year,
a fact that the appellees tried to use to show that the family was not poor. Brief for Appellees,
supra note 50, at 5-6. The cost of gasoline was also used to point out how much more economical it would have been for the Kadrmas family to sign the bus contract in the beginning and
avoid the whole controversy. This avoids the problem. The Kadrmas family probably did not
know how long the court case would take. They also did not know that they would lose on
both the district and the state supreme court levels. In such a situation people tend to live day
by day. When the Kadrmases realized the expense of driving Sarita to school, they did sign
the contract and Sarita rode the bus thereby raising the procedural issues discussed in note 58.
However, that they had to spend so much money and in the end were economically forced to
sign the contract did not deny their right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
62. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19.
63. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
64. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23.
65. Id. at 28. Powell, writing for the Court, defined "traditional indicia of suspectness" as
a class that is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id.
66. Id. at 25.
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Although the Court in Kadrmas did not specifically mention the
Rodriguez threshold requirements, it applied them by emphasizing the
fact that Sarita Kadrmas did attend school. It mentioned this fact twice.
In both instances, the fact that there was only relative as opposed to
absolute deprivation justified the rational relation standard. First,
Sarita Kadrmas, however, continued to attend school during the
time that she was denied access to the school bus. Appellants must
therefore mean to argue that the busing fee unconstitutionally
places a greater obstacle to education in the path of the poor than
it does in the path of wealthier families. 67
The Court reasoned that a "greater obstacle" is not an absolute deprivation, thus failing one of Powell's threshold requirements. "Alternatively, appellants may mean to suggest that the Equal Protection Clause
affirmatively requires government to provide free transportation to
school, at least for some class of students that would include Sarita
Kadrmas." 6 This failed the other Rodriguez threshold requirement; obviously free bus transportation is not a right specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, and "some class of student" is not an easily definable category that is traditionally suspect.6 9 The class is too broad and does not
include specific limiting factors.7 ° The Court in Kadrmas concluded,
Under either interpretation of appellants' position, we are evidently being urged to apply a form of strict or "heightened" scrutiny to the North Dakota statute. Doing so would require us to
extend the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause beyond the
limits recognized in our cases, a step we decline to take.7 1
The second time that the Court mentioned that Sarita Kadrmas was
able to attend school in spite of the hardship on her family was in the
context of other cases cited in which wealth was not held to be a "suspect" classification. The Court compared the busing fee to the fees for
voluntary bankruptcy in United States v. Kras72 and a filing fee for appellate review of adverse welfare decisions in Ortwein v. Schab.7 3 The Court
rejected the comparison to the judicial and criminal cases cited by the
appellants in which wealth was held to create a "suspect" class because
of certain important services.74 The Court failed to consider that
67. Kadrmas, 108 S.Ct. at 2487.
68. Id.

69. The two traditional characteristic of wealth as a suspect class are (1) "because of their
impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit," and (2) "as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy the benefit." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20.
70. See supra note 40 on limiting factors.
71. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487.

72. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
73. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
74. The appellants compared the busing fee in Kadrmas to other cases in which fees violated equal protection: Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to appellate review of a
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although the method of transportation to school might be voluntary, attendance in school is compulsory.7 5 Failure to attend school can bring
civil and criminal penalties.7 6
To attend school one must get to the schoolhouse door. If Sarita's
parents were not able to get her to the schoolhouse door, they faced possible civil penalties or even a possible jail term. On the basis of this analysis, the case appears closer to the judicial or quasi-criminal cases, cited
by the appellants,7 7 in which the court applied heightened scrutiny.
The Court saw the bus fee as a simple user fee not essential to education. "Sarita was denied access to the school bus only because her parents would not agree to pay the same user
fee charged to all other
78
families that took advantage of the service."
The idea that the statute authorizing the busing fee is simple economic legislation 79 concerning a user fee for a service was emphasized
when the busing fee was compared to a fee for a school lunch." The
local school superintendent said, "I think this is a service. I don't think
there's anything educational about riding on a school bus ....
Except
what your rear end learns over 12 years, being a rural kid myself."8 1 But
the comparison to the school lunch program appears flawed.
A child will need to eat whether at home or at school. She does not
need to eat the school lunch, but can bring a bag lunch from home to eat
at school. Any additional costs imposed from brown paper bags and
plastic wrap appear insignificant. The relative cost of eating lunch at
home or school is minimal.
Transportation to school is not simple economic legislation, especially in rural states such as North Dakota where the schools are often
criminal conviction conditioned on the purchase of a trial transcript); Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961) (application for a writ of habeas corpus accepted only when accompanied by a
filing fee); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (action for dissolution of marriage could
be pursued only on payment of court fees and cost of service of process); Lindsey v. Normet,

405 U.S. 56 (1972) (appeal from civil judgments in certain landlord tenant disputes conditioned on the posting of a bond for twice the amount of rent expected to accrue during the
appellate process); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (fee for blood test in quasi-criminal
paternity action brought against the putative father of a child receiving public assistance).
75. North Dakota has a statute mandating a compulsory school attendance policy. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-01 (1987).
76. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-34.1-04, 15-34.1-05, 12.1-32-01 (1987). Conviction subjects

a parent to a maximum fine of $500 for a first offense, and up to 30-days imprisonment and a
$500 fine for a second offense within one year.
77. See supra note 74.
78. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488.
79. Brief for Amicus Curiae of the State of North Dakota, supra note 44, at 8, 17.
80. In the Hearings on House Bill No. 1444 Before the Senate EducationalComm., supra
note 55, the local school superintendent said, "We contend that busing is not an educational
function. We contend busing is a service provided for the patrons much like the school lunch
program. It is not educational." Id. at 27a.
81. Id. at 32a.
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located long distances from students' homes. Sarita Kadrmas had a
thirty-two mile round trip each day to attend fourth grade. If school
attendance were optional, the analogy to the school lunch would be appropriate. A parent could choose for his or her child to go to school or
to stay home, just as a parent could choose to buy a school lunch or bring
a bag lunch from home. But a parent cannot choose whether to send his
or her child to school. Since school attendance is compulsory, some
form of transportation expense is compulsory for all those children who
cannot easily walk to school.
The issue then becomes what level of scrutiny the Court applies to a
compulsory fee that is applied inequitably between various geographical
areas within a state.8 2 By interpreting the school bus fee in Kadrmasas a
user fee, the Court avoided the minimum access to education standard of
Rodriguez.
The Court quoted Rodriguez, Plyler, and Papasan v. Allain8 3 for the
proposition that education is not a "fundamental right." This is the extent of the analysis of the access to education issue in Kadrmas.84 It
ignores 5the special place of education in American society stated in
8

Brown.

In Papasan v. Allain, decided two years before Kadrmas, the Court
in dicta stated that unresolved issues in the application of equal protection standards to educational issues remained: "As Rodriguez and Plyler
indicate, the Court has not definitively settled the questions whether a
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded
heightened equal protection review."8 6 The Court in Papasan concluded
that the nature of the case before it did not require a resolution of the
issue.8 7
The Court, in a footnote in Rodriguez, posited a situation in which
heightened scrutiny might be applied to wealth classifications involving
education:
82. See generally Neuman, TerritorialDiscrimination,Equal Protection,and Self Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 372-82 (1987); see also J. COONS, W.

CLUNE

& S.

SUGARMAN,

supra note 42.
83. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
84. Kadrmas, 108 S.Ct. at 2487.
85. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
86. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285; see also Kadrmas, 108 S.Ct. at 2491 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In Kadrmas:
The Court therefore does not address the question whether a State constitutionally
could deny a child access to a minimally adequate education. In prior cases, this
Court explicitly has left open the question whether such a deprivation of access
would violate a fundamental constitutional right [citing Papasan and Rodriguez]
That question remains open today.
Id.
87. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.
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An educational financing system might be hypothesized, however,
in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be
considerably closer. If elementary and secondary education were
made available by the State only to those able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of
"poor" people-definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from receiving
an education.
That Powell faced this issue in Plyler probably explains why he
joined the majority and concurred in Plyler. The Kadrmas appellants
raised this issue when they compared the school transportation fee to the
tuition fee in Plyler.89 The bus fee was essential to a minimum access to
education and would thus be entitled to the "heightened scrutiny" standard of Plyler rather than the "rational relation" standard of
Rodriguez.90
In Kadrmas, the Court rejected this argument and adopted the appellees position that the fee is a simple user fee that the school district
can waive if the parents are unable to pay. 9 Because the fee is potentially waivable the Court concluded, "Nor do we see any reason to suppose that this user fee will, 'promot[e] the creation and perpetuation of a
sub-class of illiterates within our boundaries ....

"92

On this basis,

O'Connor concluded that, "The case before us does not resemble Plyler,
and we
decline to extend the rationale of that decision to cover this
93
case."

Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, distinguished and narrowed Plyler again when she stated that Sarita Kadrmas, unlike the children in Plyler, was able to attend school. 94 By implication, a case
88. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25 n.60. Powell continued to explain that such an issue was
not before the court at that time:
That case [see text above] would present a far more compelling set of circumstances
for judicial assistance than the case before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken
to do a good deal more than provide an education to those who can afford it. It has

provided what it considers to be an adequate base education for all children and has
attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliorate by state funding and by the local assess-

ment program the disparities in local tax resources.
Id.
89. Brief for Appellants, supra note 46, at 16, 18, 25.
90. Id. at 17, 18.
91. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-43-11.2 (1981)

"A

[school] board may waive any fee if any pupil or his parent or guardian shall be unable to pay
such fees. No pupil's rights or privileges, including the receipt of grades or diplomas, may be
denied or abridged for the nonpayment of fees." This does not, however, resolve the issue of
the busing fee. The issue in Kadrmaswas not just not receiving grades or a diploma because of
unpaid library fines or bills for gym clothes. The school bus no longer stopped for Sarita
Kadrmas.
92. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488 (quoting and distinguishing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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involving absolute deprivation, such as Plyler, would be entitled to
heightened scrutiny, but a case involving relative deprivation, such as
Kadrmas, would not. This distinction is flawed because the children in
Plyler were not absolutely deprived of an education. They were absolutely deprived of a free education.9 5 No statute prohibited them from
attending school; they merely had to pay tuition to either the public
school or a private school.
The Plyler Court considered economic factors in analyzing deprivation, and concluded that substantial deprivation (the assumption was
that most illegal aliens have a low income or are poor) was equal to absolute deprivation, thus triggering "heightened scrutiny."9 6 Thus, Plyler
could also be considered a comparative deprivation case. The Rodriguez
Court left the comparative deprivation issue unresolved. 97 In Plyler, the
Court assumed there was absolute deprivation, so the issue did not arise.
The Court, in Kadrmas, used comparative discrimination only as a part
of the Rodriguez threshold test and avoided any analysis of its broader
implications.9 8
[T]he Kadrmas family could and did find a private alternative to
the public school bus service for which Dickinson charged a fee.
That alternative was more expensive, to be sure, and we have no
reason to doubt that genuine hardships were endured by the
Kadrmas family when Sarita was denied access to the bus. Such
facts, however, do not imply that the Equal Protection Clause has
been violated. 99
Using the rational relation standard of Rodriguez, the Court in
Kadrmas concluded that:
Applying the appropriate test-under which a statute is upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate government objective-we think it is quite clear that a State's decision to allow local
school boards the option of charging patrons a user fee for bus
service is constitutionally permissible. The Constitution does not
require that such service be provided at all, and it is difficult to
95. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 206 n.2.
96. Id. at 224, 226, 230.
97. Powell said:
Appellees' [Rodriguez's] comparative-discrimination theory would still face serious
unanswered questions, including whether a bare positive correlation or some higher
degree of correlation is necessary to provide a basis for concluding that the financing
system is designed to operate to the peculiardisadvantage of the comparativelypoor,
and whether a class of this size and diversity could ever claim the special protection
accorded "suspect" classes. These questions need not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees' proof fails to support their allegations or the District Court's
conclusion.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Note especially the word
"disadvantaged" as opposed to deprivation, and the words "comparatively poor" as opposed
to indigent. This is essentially the issue in Kadrmas and it is an issue that O'Connor avoided.
98. Kadrmas, 108 S.Ct. at 2487-88.
99. Id. at 2488.
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imagine why choosing to offer the service should entail a constitutional obligation to offer it for free."
By essentially avoiding the education issue and focusing on the user
fee and local control, Kadrmas echoed Rodriguez's deference to the legislature's role, 10 a concern that the Plyler dissent emphasized.10
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun in his Kadrmas dissent,
accepted the traditional rational relation test applied in Rodriguez when
neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right exists and applied the test
to Kadrmas.'0 3 Although he accepted the traditional test, he rejected
any finding that there was a rational relation between North Dakota's
state interest in reorganized school districts and the imposition of a busing fee in nonreorganized school districts. 0 4 Rational is defined as including " 'a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically
believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.' "'o He
accepted Justice Marshall's description, in his separate dissent, of the
harm to the disadvantaged class of poor children. °6 Stevens then concluded that since the State's motive in encouraging district reorganization by allaying parental concern about transportation cost had been
achieved, there was no longer a justification for imposing a special burden on those districts that decided not to reorganize:
[A]fter the voters in a school district have had a fair opportunity to
decide whether or not to reorganize, there is no longer any justification at all for allowing the nonreorganized districts to place an
obstacle in the paths of poor children seeking an education in some
parts of the State that has been removed in other parts of the
100. Id. at 2489.
101. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42. "Education... presents a myriad of 'intractable economic,
social, and even philosophical problems.'" (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487
(1970)). "The very complexity of the problems.., suggests that 'there will be more than one
constitutionally permissible method of solving them,' and that, within the limits of rationality,
'the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems' should be entitled to respect." (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972)).
102. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated:
Denying a free education to illegal alien children is not a choice I would make were I
a legislator. Apart from compassionate considerations, the long-range costs of excluding any children from the public schools may well outweigh the costs of educating them. But [the] fact that there are sound policy arguments against the Texas
Legislature's choice does not render that choice an unconstitutional one.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 252-53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original). He continued
that while the" 'specter of a permanent caste' of illegal Mexican residents of the United States
is indeed a disturbing one ... it is but one segment of a larger problem, which is for the
political branches to solve." Id. at 254.
103. Kadrmas, 108 S.Ct. at 2494-95 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2494 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
106. Id.
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State. 107
Justice Marshall's separate dissent in Kadrmas echoed his famous
dissent in Rodriguez,10 8 fifteen years earlier. He quoted Brown v. Board
of Education to support the "extraordinary nature" of education and the
"vital role of education in our society,"1 °9 and condemned the majority
opinion as a "retreat from the promise of equal educational opportunity
by holding that a school district's refusal to allow an indigent child who
lives 16 miles from the nearest school to use a schoolbus service without
paying a fee does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.""' 0
In Brown the suspect class was race; in Kadrmas, it was poverty.
Marshall felt that the schoolchildren discriminated against in Kadrmas
should be afforded the same equal protection rights as the children in
Brown. "I do not believe that this Court should sanction discrimination
against the poor with respect to 'perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments' .

*..
11!

He continued, "The statute at

issue here burdens a poor person's interest in an education."1'12 He
stressed that "[t]he extraordinary nature of this interest cannot be de'
nied," 113
and he concluded, "The Court's decision . . . 'demonstrates

once again a "callous indifference to the realities of life for the
poor." ' "114
Marshall also criticized the Court's avoidance of the basic issues in
the case. "The Court's opinion suggests that this case does not concern
state action that discriminates against the poor with regard to the provision of a basic education."1 1 By defining the issue as the Court did,
"this case presents [to the majority] no troublesome questions; indeed,
the Court's facile analysis 16suggests some perplexity as to why this case
ever reached this Court."'
He pointed out to the Court that "the Constitution is concerned
with 'sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.' "117 He admonished the Court for its failure to see the underlying
issue. "These realities may not always be obvious from the Court's vantage point, but the Court fails in its constitutional duties when it refuses,
107. Id. at 2495 (Stevens,J.,dissenting) (footnote omitted).
108. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
109. Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2493 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
110. Id. at 2491.
111. Id. at 2491 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
112. Id. at 2493.

113. Id.
114. Id.at 2494 (quoting Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group,
468 U.S. 841, 876 (1984) (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 166 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
115. Id. at 2491.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 2491-92 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
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as it does today, to make even the effort to see." 11 8
Justice Marshall's earlier remedy to the problem of the Court's reluctance to extend equal protection to the poor was his suggestion in the
last footnote in Rodriguez. He said there, "[N]othing in the Court's decision today should inhibit further review of state educational funding
schemes under state constitutional provisions."' 1 9
III.

California's Equal Protection Educational Standard

State constitutions can expand constitutional rights for their citizens
beyond those rights granted by the Federal Constitution as long as the
state law does not directly conflict with a federal constitutional provision.1 20 In Serrano v. Priest,'2' the California Supreme Court held that
education in California was a fundamental right 122 and that a state educational finance system that discriminated against poor districts in the
State violated the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution. 23 California used the provisions of the California Constitution to
declare education a fundamental right and to protect education by using
the strict scrutiny standard. 124 California raised its standard despite the
United States Supreme Court rejection of the strict scrutiny standard in
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,12 5 a case with facts similar to
those of Serrano. 26 California extended the protection that the United
States Supreme Court in Brown gave to race127 to wealth based discrimination in education. California used a strict scrutiny test when a suspect
classification (based on district wealth) and a fundamental interest (edu118. Id. at 2494. Justice Marshall continued:
[F]or the poor, education is often the only route by which to become full participants
in our society. In allowing a State to burden the access of poor persons to an education, the Court denies equal opportunity and discourages hope. I do not believe the

Equal Protection Clause countenances such a result. I therefore dissent.
Id.
119. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited
Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super.
223, 287 A.2d 187, 119 N.J. Super 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,

487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
120. See Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
121. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), later appeal, 18 Cal.3d 728,
557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
122. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 761, 557 P.2d 929, 948, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 364

(1976).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 765-66, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
Id.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See supra note 12.
See supra note I and accompanying text.
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cation) existed. 2 8
In Salazar v. Honig,129 a case with facts similar to those of Kadrmas,
a California appellate court applied the Serrano principle to find an education code section on school transportation unconstitutional.1 30 The
code section allowed public school districts to charge pupils a fee for
transportation. The court held that the code section violated both the
free school guarantee"' and the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution. 132 The court analyzed the importance of transportation
to education and concluded that "student transportation fees are invalid
because pupil transportation is (1) a fundamental educational activity,
(2) which is an integral part of California's system of free public
133
education."

Conclusion
Kadrmas raises important questions about the relationship between
poverty and education. By implication, it raises important questions
about all those governmental services that are not specifically enumerated for protection in the Constitution. Most people consider certain
public services essential for life in a modern democratic society. Educa128. "[C]lassification[s] which [are] based on district wealth clearly affect the fundamental
interest of the children of the state in education, and we hold here, as we held in Serrano I...
that this combination offactors warrants strict judicial scrutiny under our state equal-protection provisions." Serrano v. Priest, 200 Cal. App. 3d 897, 931, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 605 (1986)
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
129. Salazar v. Honig, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1576, 246 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1988).
130. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39807.5 (West Supp. 1989).
131. CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § 5 (West 1989). See also Salazar, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1584,
246 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
132. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7(a)(b); art. IV(a) (West 1989); see also Salazar:
A fee for a public education program or activity (1) touches upon a fundamental
interest-education, and (2) classifies on the basis of a suspect classification-wealth
Like extracurricular activities, student transportation promotes public education
and, therefore, is encompassed within the concept of education as a fundamental
interest.... Moreover, student transportation fees interfere with a student's right to
enjoy the benefits of a fundamental right-free public education. Since some families
who are not eligible for the fee-waiver, find transportation fees an economic hardship,
it is evident that the fees impose disparate burdens on students according to their
families' wealth ...."[A]t least where education is concerned-the protection afforded by the equal protection guarantee does not stop at the poverty line. It also
addresses inequalities within the category of 'nonneedy' families."
Salazar,200 Cal. App. 3d at 1587, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (citations omitted).
133. Salazar, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1584, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 840. The court continued:
The particular educational benefits of transportation are considerable and varied.
Transportation promotes the safety of schoolchildren ... ; it has been employed to

advance the cause of equal educational opportunity through busing plans; and it conserves public funds for education by allowing for the creation of centralized school
districts, thus preventing the need to build schools in rural or sparsely populated
areas.
Id. at 1585, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (citations omitted).

Summer 19891

KADRMA4S V DICKINSON PUBLIC SCHOOLS

tion is certainly such a service. Although the Court has applied either a
strict or a heightened scrutiny standard to discrimination based on race
and alienage, it has not extended such protection to the poor.
As the Court had to face the issue of race in the 1950s and 1960s it
will have to face the issue of poverty in the 1990s. What Brown v. Board
of Education did for the education of black children in America, Sarita
Kadrmas's mother tried to do for the poor rural families of North Dakota. That she failed indicates only that the time was not yet ripe. The
Court avoided the issue in Kadrmas and affirmed Rodriguez. Important,
unanswered questions from Rodriguez remain unresolved. Where the
Court will draw the line between absolute and relative deprivation of essential but unprotected governmental services such as education remains
unclear. The Court had traditionally indicated that these basic policy
decisions are the function of the legislature. What pressure state
supreme court decisions in this area will have upon the United States
Supreme Court remains an interesting, open question.
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